

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

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3  
4 WILLIAM J. WILKINS,

5 Plaintiff,

6 v.

7 DOUGLAS COUNTY SHERIFF'S  
8 OFFICE, *et al.*

9 Defendants.

3:11-cv-00830-HDM-VPC

**REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION**  
**OF U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE**

April 26, 2012

10 This Report and Recommendation is made to the Honorable Howard D. McKibben, Senior  
11 United States District Judge. The action was referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge pursuant  
12 to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and LR IB 1-4. Before the court is plaintiff's civil rights complaint,  
13 which he filed on November 17, 2011 (#1-1).<sup>1</sup> On February 14, 2012, the court granted plaintiff's  
14 application to proceed *in forma pauperis* and directed plaintiff to pay the initial installment of the  
15 filing fee (#3). Plaintiff complied (#6). The court now screens plaintiff's complaint pursuant to 28  
16 U.S.C. § 1915.

17 **I. HISTORY & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND**

18 Plaintiff William J. Wilkins ("plaintiff"), a *pro se* litigant, is currently incarcerated at  
19 Northern Nevada Correctional Center ("NNCC"), though the claims giving rise to the instant  
20 complaint occurred before he was convicted of a crime and incarcerated at NNCC (#1-1). Plaintiff  
21 brings his complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming that defendants acted with deliberate  
22 indifference to plaintiff's serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment during his  
23 arrest and pretrial detention at the Douglas County jail. *Id.*

24 Plaintiff sues the Douglas County Sheriff's Office in its official capacity, Carson Tahoe  
25 Regional Medical Clinic, Carson Tahoe Regional Medical Center, and six "John Doe" defendants  
26

27  
28 <sup>1</sup> Refers to the court's docket number.

1 in their individual and official capacities for alleged violations of his Eighth Amendment rights  
2 during his arrest and pretrial detention. *Id.* Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages. *Id.*

3 Plaintiff alleges several violations against Doe defendants in count I. Plaintiff states that on  
4 November 17, 2009, two officers from the Douglas County Sheriff's Office arrested him at his home  
5 (#1-1, p. 6). Plaintiff alleges that before defendants arrested him, he informed them of his torn  
6 rotator cuff and physical disability. *Id.* He claims that Doe defendants #1 and #2 violated his Eighth  
7 Amendment rights when they refused to use "two pairs [of handcuffs] interlinked" and acted with  
8 deliberate indifference when they arrested him. *Id.*

9 Plaintiff alleges that Doe defendant #3, a booking officer at the Douglas County Sheriff's  
10 Office, acted with deliberate indifference when he told plaintiff to "stop the drama your [sic] not  
11 going anywhere" despite the fact that plaintiff was shaking. *Id.* at 7. Plaintiff claims that Douglas  
12 County jail staff told him that he would not receive medical attention until he had been at the jail for  
13 three or four days. *Id.*

14 On approximately November 20, 2009, a nurse examined plaintiff and determined that he  
15 did not need further attention. *Id.* Plaintiff alleges that two escorting officers, Doe defendants #4  
16 and #5 disagreed with the nurse, and transported plaintiff to the Carson Tahoe Regional Medical  
17 Center Clinic. *Id.* at 8. At the clinic, a physician examined plaintiff and determined that he was  
18 dehydrated and had high blood pressure. *Id.* The physician informed Doe defendants #4 and #5 that  
19 plaintiff needed medical attention to prevent a possible stroke. *Id.* Plaintiff alleges that "knowing  
20 full well what their orders for treating [him] were, they ignored them with complete deliberate  
21 indifference" and refused to give plaintiff his prescribed medication. *Id.*

22 Lastly, plaintiff claims that upon returning to the jail, he was "pulled out of the cell and  
23 threatened by John doe 6," that he would be "put into a straight jacket and locked in a mental room."  
24 *Id.* Doe defendant #6 is an officer at the Douglas County Sheriff's Office. *Id.*

25 On approximately November 22, 2009, a nurse at the jail examined plaintiff and "confirmed  
26 [his] neglected state and confirmed that [his] blood pressure was extremely high." *Id.* at 9. Plaintiff  
27 received medication to treat his high blood pressure. *Id.* Plaintiff alleges that the jail gave him the  
28 "wrong medication" which caused him to become lightheaded and caused his arm to "tingle." *Id.*

1 Plaintiff states that he does not clearly remember what occurred next but that he woke up in the back  
 2 of an ambulance because he had suffered a stroke. *Id.* Plaintiff returned to the jail after treatment.  
 3 *Id.*

4 In count II, plaintiff alleges that when Doe defendants #4 and #5 took him to the hospital, the  
 5 physicians at Carson Tahoe Regional Medical Center did not properly care for his medical condition  
 6 due to his "inmate status" and sent him back to the Douglas County jail. *Id.* at 11. Plaintiff further  
 7 states that he did not receive adequate treatment at the Carson Tahoe Regional Medical Center  
 8 Clinic. *Id.* at 12. Plaintiff claims that the physicians and nurses are liable for damages and names  
 9 Carson Tahoe Regional Medical Center and Carson Tahoe Regional Medical Center Clinic as  
 10 defendants. *Id.*

## 11 II. DISCUSSION & ANALYSIS

### 12 A. Discussion

#### 13 1. Screening Standard

14 Applications to proceed *in forma pauperis* are governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which provides  
 15 that "the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal  
 16 (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks  
 17 monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-  
 18 (iii). "To sustain an action under Section 1983, a plaintiff must show (1) that the conduct  
 19 complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) that the conduct  
 20 deprived the plaintiff of a federal constitutional or statutory right." *Wood v. Ostrader*, 879 F.2d 583,  
 21 587 (9th Cir. 1989), *cert. denied*, 498 U.S. 938 (1990).

22 Dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted is  
 23 provided for in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and this court applies the same standard  
 24 under Section 1915(e)(2) when reviewing the adequacy of a complaint or amended complaint.  
 25 Review under Rule 12(b)(6) is essentially a ruling on a question of law. *See Chappel v. Lab. Corp.*  
 26 *of America*, 232 F.3d 719, 723 (9th Cir. 2000). Dismissal for failure to state a claim is proper only  
 27 if it is clear that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle  
 28 him or her to relief. *See Morley v. Walker*, 175 F.3d 756, 759 (9th Cir. 1999). In making this

determination, the court takes as true all allegations of material fact stated in the complaint, and the court construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. *See Warsaw v. Xoma Corp.*, 74 F.3d 955, 957 (9th Cir. 1996). Allegations in *pro se* complaints are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. *See Hughes v. Rowe*, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980); *Haines v. Kerner*, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) (*per curiam*); *see also Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't*, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). While the standard under Rule 12(b)(6) does not require detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff must provide more than mere labels and conclusions. *Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action is insufficient. *Id.*; *see also Papasan v. Allain*, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986).

Additionally, a reviewing court should “begin by identifying pleadings [allegations] that, because they are no more than mere conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009). “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported with factual allegations.” *Id.* “When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. *Id.* “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” *Id.*

## **B. Analysis**

Plaintiff alleges violations of his Eighth Amendment rights (#1-1). Specifically, plaintiff believes that Doe defendants #1 - #6 acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs during his arrest and pretrial detention at the Douglas County Sheriff's Office and jail. *Id.*

### **1. Count I Defendants**

#### **a. Official Capacity Suits**

Plaintiff brings suit against Doe defendants #1, #2, #3, #4, #5, and #6, officers at the Douglas County Sheriff's Office, in their official and individual capacities. The claims against these defendants in their official capacities are actually suits against the entity of which the named defendants are agents. *See Kentucky v. Graham*, 473 U.S. 159 (1985). “As long as the government entity receives notice and an opportunity to respond, an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other

1 than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity.” *Id.* at 166. The real party in interest in such  
 2 suits is the entity itself, and the entity, not the named defendant, will be liable for any damages. *Id.*  
 3 Thus, the official capacity claims against defendants are properly considered claims against the entity  
 4 they serve – Douglas County.

5 *Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs.*, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), held that municipalities, such as  
 6 Douglas County, are “persons” subject to damages liability under Section 1983 where “action  
 7 pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature cause[s] a constitutional tort.” *Id.* at 691. The  
 8 Court emphasized that the municipality itself must cause the constitutional deprivation, and that a  
 9 city or county may not be held vicariously liable for the unconstitutional acts of its employees under  
 10 the theory of respondeat superior. *Id.*

11 Here, plaintiff does not allege that any of the defendants’ actions conformed to an official  
 12 policy, custom, or practice of Douglas County. Rather, plaintiff alleges that defendants, acting under  
 13 color of state law, violated his constitutional rights – acts for which Douglas County may not be held  
 14 vicariously liable. Therefore, all official capacity suits against defendants are dismissed with  
 15 prejudice.<sup>2</sup>

16 **b. Claim - Deliberate Indifference to a Serious Medical Need**

17 Plaintiff asserts claims for deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment against six  
 18 Doe defendants. However, “Eighth Amendment scrutiny is appropriate only after the State has  
 19 complied with the constitutional guarantees traditionally associated with criminal prosecutions  
 20 ... [T]he State does not acquire the power to punish with which the Eighth Amendment is concerned  
 21 until after it has secured a formal adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law.” *City*  
 22 *of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp.*, 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983) (quoting *Ingraham v. Wright*, 430 U.S.  
 23 651, 671-72 n.40 (1977)). In the instant case, the Eighth Amendment is inapplicable because  
 24 plaintiff was not a prison inmate under a judgment of conviction at the time of the alleged events.

25 Nevertheless, courts have a duty to construe *pro se* pleadings liberally, including *pro se*

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26  
 27 <sup>2</sup> The court notes that plaintiff’s official capacity claims for monetary damages must also be  
 28 dismissed because these claims are barred by state sovereign immunity recognized by the Eleventh  
 Amendment. See *Taylor v. List*, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989).

1 motions as well as complaints. *Bernhardt v. Los Angeles County*, 339 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 2003).  
2 Thus, when a plaintiff proceeds *pro se*, the district court is required to afford him the benefit of the  
3 doubt in ascertaining what claims he raised in his complaint and argued to the district court.  
4 *Morrison v. Hall*, 261 F.3d 896, 899 n.2 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotations marks omitted). The  
5 Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a pretrial detainee the right to receive  
6 adequate medical care and attention, and that right is violated if officials are deliberately indifferent  
7 to the detainee's serious medical needs. *Clouthier v. County of Contra Costa*, 591 F.3d 1232, 1242-  
8 43 (9th Cir. 2010). Deliberate indifference exists when an official knows of and disregards a serious  
9 medical condition, *i.e.*, when an official is "aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn  
10 that a substantial risk of serious harm exists" and actually draws that inference. *Farmer v. Brennan*,  
11 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). The same standard applies to a pretrial detainee's claim of deliberate  
12 indifference under the Fourteenth Amendment as to a prisoner's claim under the Eighth Amendment.  
13 *Frost v. Agnos*, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998).

14 Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee at the time of the alleged violations. Accordingly, the court  
15 construes plaintiff's claims against each Doe defendant as arising under the Fourteenth Amendment  
16 Due Process Clause.

17 John Does #1 and #2

18 Plaintiff alleges that Doe defendants #1 and #2 acted with deliberate indifference in the  
19 course of arresting plaintiff (#1-1, p. 6). Plaintiff states that he informed the officers that he was a  
20 disabled veteran and that they needed to be careful in the "process of arrest because [his] left rotator  
21 [cuff] was ripped." *Id.* Plaintiff recommended that the officers "use two pairs [of handcuffs]  
22 interlinked so as not to cause undue damage" during arrest. *Id.* Plaintiff states that the officers  
23 refused to do so and thereby caused him extreme and wanton pain. *Id.* at 7.

24 Plaintiff sufficiently alleges that Doe defendants #1 and #2 knew of his "serious injury"  
25 because he informed them about it. Further, plaintiff states that defendants "ignored his complaints  
26 of serious wanton infliction of pain to the point of mistreatment." *Id.* at 6. Plaintiff claims that after  
27 the arrest, he "had to lay down in the seat of the squad car to try to prevent any further ripping  
28 damage." *Id.* at 7. Accordingly, plaintiff has stated a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim

1 against Doe defendants #1 and #2, and this claim should advance.

2 John Doe #3

3 Plaintiff alleges that after Doe defendants #1 and #2 took him to the Douglas County  
4 Sheriff's Office, Doe defendant #3, an intake officer, "failed to do anything to stop the deliberate  
5 indifference to plaintiff's medical needs" (#1-1, p. 2). Such a conclusory allegation that defendant  
6 was deliberately indifferent to plaintiff's medical needs because he "failed to do anything" will not  
7 suffice. *Id.* Plaintiff states that jail staff noticed that plaintiff was shaking and refused to give him  
8 his medication. *Id.* at 7. Plaintiff alleges that Doe defendant #3 told plaintiff to "stop the drama your  
9 [sic] not going anywhere." *Id.*

10 The facts alleged do not show that the defendant knew of a risk to plaintiff's safety and  
11 intentionally disregarded that risk. Plaintiff alleges that "jail staff" noticed that he was shaking but  
12 fails to allege this particular defendant actually knew of a serious medical need and disregarded that  
13 need. Moreover, defendant's statement alone is not evidence of deliberate indifference because  
14 plaintiff does not allege that defendant denied plaintiff's request for medical care, but only that  
15 defendant told plaintiff that he was "not going anywhere." Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Doe  
16 defendant #3 and this claim should be dismissed with prejudice.

17 John Does #4 and #5

18 Plaintiff alleges that on approximately his third day at the Douglas County jail, two escorting  
19 officers, Doe defendants #4 and #5, took him to the Carson Tahoe Regional Medical Center Clinic.  
20 *Id.* at 8. Plaintiff claims that the treating physician informed defendants that plaintiff was dehydrated  
21 and had high blood pressure. *Id.* The physician warned defendants that if plaintiff did not receive  
22 treatment, he could suffer a stroke. *Id.* Plaintiff states that "with complete deliberate indifference"  
23 defendants took him back to the jail and refused to give him medication and did not treat his  
24 dehydration. *Id.* A nurse examined plaintiff twenty-four hours later; however, plaintiff alleges that  
25 the delay in treatment led to further injury. *Id.* at 5.

26 Deliberate indifference can be manifested by prison officials intentionally denying or  
27 delaying access to medical care or interfering with the treatment once prescribed. *Estelle v. Gamble*,

28



1 429 U.S. 797, 104-05 (1976).<sup>3</sup> Plaintiff states a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against  
 2 Doe defendants #4 and #5 because he alleges a serious medical need – dehydration and high blood  
 3 pressure, and alleges that defendants delayed plaintiff's treatment and caused him further harm. This  
 4 claim should advance.

5 Plaintiff also attempts to sue defendants for negligence; however, simply stating that  
 6 defendants were negligent is insufficient to state a negligence claim. *Id.* Plaintiff's state law  
 7 negligence claim against defendants #4 and #5 should be dismissed with leave to amend.

#### 8 John Doe #6

9 Plaintiff alleges that on the fourth day of his detention, he "was pulled out of the cell and  
 10 threatened by John Doe 6" that he "would be put into a straight jacket and locked in a mental room."  
 11 *Id.* at 8-9. Plaintiff does not state a claim for a violation of his constitutional rights. In the caption  
 12 of his complaint, plaintiff states that Doe defendant #6 "made retaliatory threats to plaintiff." *Id.* at  
 13 4. However, plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to state a claim for a violation of his  
 14 constitutional rights under the First or Fourteenth Amendment because defendant did not actually  
 15 retaliate or act in deliberate indifference to plaintiff's safety. Doe defendant #6 should be dismissed  
 16 with prejudice.

17 Plaintiff's allegations implicate his Fourteenth Amendment rights against unidentified Doe  
 18 defendants #1, #2, #4, and #5. The use of Doe defendants is not favored in the Ninth Circuit. *See*  
 19 *Gillespie v. Civiletti*, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir.1980). However, where the identity of alleged  
 20 defendants cannot be known prior to the filing of a complaint, the plaintiff should be given an  
 21 opportunity through discovery to identify them. *Id.* Failure to afford the plaintiff such an  
 22 opportunity is error. *See Wakefield v. Thompson*, 177 F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir.1999). Accordingly,  
 23 plaintiff shall be allowed to conduct limited pre-service discovery in an effort to ascertain the true  
 24 identity of Doe defendants #1, #2, #4, and #5. Plaintiff will be permitted to serve five interrogatories

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25  
 26 <sup>3</sup> Courts of other federal Circuits have also found deliberate indifference where prison officials  
 27 ignored a previous physician's treatment plan. *White v. Napoleon*, 897 F.2d 103 (3rd Cir. 1990) (finding  
 28 cognizable claim where prison officials ignored private hospital's treatment orders and refused inmate's  
 access to prescribed medication); *Gill v. Mooney*, 824 F.2d 192 (2nd Cir. 1987) (finding cognizable claim  
 where prison officials refused to follow a physician's recommendations).



1 on the Douglas County Sheriff, at the Douglas County Sheriff's Office Administration to discover  
 2 the identities of these defendants. If plaintiff learns the identities of the officers who allegedly  
 3 violated his rights, he shall file an amended complaint to add them as named defendants. If plaintiff  
 4 is unable to learn the identity of at least one Doe defendant, this action will be dismissed without  
 5 prejudice.

## 6           2.       Count II Defendants

7           Plaintiff sues the Carson Tahoe Regional Medical Center and the Carson Tahoe Regional  
 8 Medical Center Clinic. However, buildings are not "persons" under section 1983 and cannot be  
 9 sued. Moreover, plaintiff attempts to sue the entities for deliberate indifference to his medical needs  
 10 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, to state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege two  
 11 essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was  
 12 violated; and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.  
 13 *See West v. Atkins*, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). These entities are not state actors and plaintiff does not  
 14 allege any state action. The Carson Tahoe Regional Medical Center and Carson Tahoe Regional  
 15 Medical Center Clinic should be dismissed with prejudice.

16           Plaintiff also attempts to sue the Douglas County Sheriff's Office. Plaintiff cannot sue the  
 17 Douglas County Sheriff's Office because a jail building is not a "person" under section 1983 and  
 18 cannot be sued. Claims against the Douglas County Sheriff's Office should be dismissed with  
 19 prejudice.<sup>4</sup>

20           To the extent plaintiff attempts to bring state law claims against the Douglas County Sheriff's  
 21 Office, plaintiff's state law claims should also be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Nevada law.  
 22 Under Nevada law, "in the absence of statutory authorization, a department of the municipal  
 23 government may not, in the department name, sue or be sued." *Wayment v. Holmes*, 112 Nev. 232,  
 24 912 P.2d 816, 819 (Nev. 1996); *Schneider v. Elko County Sheriff's Dep't*, 17 F.Supp.2d 1162, 1165  
 25 (D.Nev. 1998) (finding that an action against Elko County Sheriff's Department was frivolous for  
 26

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27           <sup>4</sup> Even if the court were to construe this as a claim against Douglas County, plaintiff fails to  
 28 allege that a custom or policy caused the alleged constitutional violations which is required for section 1983  
 claims against a municipality. *See Monell*, 436 U.S. at 694.

1 lack of capacity to be sued).

## 2 C. Motion for Appointment of Counsel

3 Plaintiff has filed a motion seeking the appointment of counsel in this case (#1-3). A litigant  
4 in a civil right action does not have a Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel. *Storseth v.*  
5 *Spellman*, 654 F.2d 1349, 13253 (9th Cir. 1981). In very limited circumstances, federal courts are  
6 empowered to request an attorney to represent an indigent civil litigant. The instances in which a  
7 court will make such a request, however, are exceedingly rare, and the court will make the request  
8 under only extraordinary circumstances. *United States v. 30.64 Acres of Land*, 795 F.2d 796, 799-  
9 800 (9th Cir. 1986); *Wilborn v. Escalderon*, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986).

10 A finding of such exceptional circumstances requires that the court evaluate both the  
11 likelihood of success on the merits and the plaintiff's ability to articulate his claims in *pro se* in light  
12 of the complexity of the legal issues involved. Neither factor is dispositive, and both must be viewed  
13 together in making a finding. *Terrell v. Brewer*, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991)(citing *Wilborn*,  
14 *supra*, 789 F.2d at 1331). The court has considerable discretion in making these findings. The court  
15 will not enter an order directing the appointment of counsel, as plaintiff has demonstrated his ability  
16 to articulate his claims in *pro se*. Therefore, this court recommends that plaintiff's motion for the  
17 appointment be denied.

## 18 III. CONCLUSION

19 Based on the foregoing and for good cause appearing, the court recommends that plaintiff's  
20 Fourteenth Amendment due process claims against Doe defendants #1, #2, #4, and #5 **ADVANCE**.  
21 The court also recommends that plaintiff file an amended complaint to add Doe defendants #1, #2,  
22 #4, and #5 as named defendants. The court recommends that plaintiff's claims against Doe  
23 defendants #3 and #6, and claims against Carson Tahoe Regional Medical Center, Carson Tahoe  
24 Regional Medical Center Clinic, and the Douglas County Sheriff's Office be **DISMISSED WITH**  
25 **PREJUDICE**. The court recommends that plaintiff's remaining claims be **DISMISSED** in  
26 accordance with the guidance provided in this Report and Recommendation. Finally, the court  
27 recommends that plaintiff's motion for the appointment of counsel be **DENIED**. The parties are  
28 advised:

#### IV. RECOMMENDATION

**IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED** that plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment due process for deliberate indifference **ADVANCE** as to Doe defendants #1, #2, #4, and #5. If plaintiff the identity of these defendants, he shall file an amended complaint to add them as named ants.

1) Negligence Claim against Doe defendants #4 and #5.

1) Official capacity suits against defendants Doe #1, Doe #2, Doe #3, Doe #4, Doe #5, and Doe #6;

2) Deliberate Indifference claim against Doe defendant #3;

3) Deliberate Indifference claim against Doe defendant #6;

4) Claims against Carson Tahoe Regional Medical Center;

5) Claims against Carson Tahoe Regional Medical Center Clinic;

6) Claims against Douglas County Sheriff's Office.

